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1 Introduction
Futures markets have been most commonly justi…ed as a consequence of
…rms’ attempt to hedge against ‡uctuations in the price or to take advantage
of arbitrage opportunities. More recently, the strategic interaction between
futures and spot markets has been analyzed. Williams (1987) develops a
model in which positions in one market a¤ect the costs in the other, thus
altering the circumstances of competition. Allaz and Vila (1993) (from now
on, A&V) show, in an oligopolistic context, that …rms may use the futures
markets as a way to commit to a quantity, and increase their market share.
The result is that all …rms have an incentive to do so, with an increase in the
total quantity supplied by the industry. In a later work, Hughes and Kao
(1997) (H&K), following Backwell (1995), argue that this pro-competitive
e¤ect holds only if there is perfect observability. In their analysis, if futures
positions are not observed, the equilibrium is again the Cournot behavior.
In the present work we study the role of observability in more detail. First
we notice that the result in H&K is based on two implicit assumptions. One is
a strong version of the no-arbitrage condition: the price in the futures market
must be the same as in the spot market in every contingency. This means
that the two prices have to coincide, not only along the equilibrium path,
but also along deviations from the equilibrium. The lack of observability is
made explicit by specifying that …rms do not observe futures positions by the
rival, but the authors make the second implicit assumption by adding that
…rms cannot observe prices in the futures market. Firms realize deviations
only when they sell in the spot market. The …rst implicit assumption is
made in the two cases they study, namely total presence and total absence
of observability. The second implicit assumption is made in the case with no
observability. Once these assumptions are made explicit, other possibilities
can be considered and compared. The following cases are worth studying.
(1) Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and
…rms observe quantities (or prices) in the futures market.
(2) Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and
…rms cannot observe prices or quantities in the futures market, and
(3) Future and spot market prices coincide along the equilibrium path and
…rms observe prices, but not quantities, in the futures market.
Case 1 is the model in A&V. Case 2 illustrates the point made by H&K,
namely, that if positions are not observed we return to the Cournot outcome.
Case 3 deals with a weaker version of the no-arbitrage condition and opens
new possibilities, depending of how deviations from the equilibrium are ob-
served and a¤ect the price in the futures market. In this work we present
explicit game forms for all the cases (1, 2 and subcases of 3).
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The di¤erences in the game form highlights the merits of each of the cases.
In particular, cases 1 and 2 do not explicitly model the demand side of the
futures market. A natural assumption is that …rms can make inferences about
the quantities sold in the futures market by observing the futures price. If
this price does not carry full information about futures quantities, some kind
of market imperfection must be called for. To this end, in case 3 we introduce
a set of arbitrators whose role is to buy in the futures market and sell in the
spot market. Competition among arbitrators ensures that, in equilibrium,
future and spot prices coincide. However, deviations from an equilibrium
may change the futures and spot prices in di¤erent ways, because of the
imperfect information about quantities.
A remarkable result is that case 3 contains 1 as a subcase, but does not
contain 2, as the introduction of total absence of observability in case 3 results
in the competitive outcome, not the Cournot. In fact, the only equilibria that
may arise in models that …t in case 3 imply prices between the competitive
and the A&V prices. Thus our work presents an argument that undermines
the result in H&K. Observability is important, but it may work in a very
di¤erent way than thought previously. In a last section we argue that our
model explains better some stylized facts observed in the futures markets of
the power industry in England and Wales.
In section 2 we present the basic model. In section 3 we present the models
for di¤erent assumptions on observability. Section 4 o¤ers the discussion for
the power industry in the U.K.. Section 5 concludes.
2 The basic model
Allaz and Vila (1993) formulate the following case: Consider a duopoly pro-
ducing an homogeneous good competing a la Cournot with zero costs and
facing a demand given by p = A ¡ q. Suppose that before producing and
selling in the spot market, …rms may sell in advance part of their production
in a futures market. Denote by si and fi the quantities sold by …rm i in the
spot and futures market respectively (qi = si+fi). If positions in the futures
market are observable, given f1 and f2, in the spot market …rm i solves:
max
si
psi
s.t p = A¡ f1 ¡ f2 ¡ s1 ¡ s2
The solution gives the reaction function si =
A¡f1¡f2¡sj
2
or, in terms of
total quantities, qi =
A+fi¡qj
2
. Solving for s1 and s2, one …nds si =
A¡f1¡f2
3
,
qi =
A+2fi¡fj
3
, and p = A¡f1¡f2
3
.
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Anticipating this reaction, …rms’ position in the futures market is calcu-
lated as follows:
max
fi
p (fi + si) (1)
s.t si = p =
A¡ f1 ¡ f2
3
The solution to this problem is fi =
A¡fj
4
. Solving for f1 and f2, and
substituting in the expressions for the other variables, the result is fi = p =
si =
A
5
, qi = 25A, with pro…ts given by ¦i =
2
25
A2. The equilibrium is
thus showing a pro-competitive e¤ect of the futures market as the Cournot
equilibrium without it is qi = p = A3 , with ¦i =
A2
9
. To understand why this
occurs, notice that if, for whatever reason, it is known that …rm 2 does not use
the futures market, then …rm 1 chooses f2 = A4 and then p = si =
A
4
, q1 = 12A,
q2 =
1
4
A. Firms are behaving as if …rm 1 were the Stackelberg leader. The
pro-competitive e¤ect is caused as …rms compete to be the “leader”.
Without observability, Hughes and Kao (1997) conclude a totally di¤erent
story. If futures positions are not observable, the reaction functions derived
from the …rst of the previous problems require that non observed variables
be conjectural:
qi =
A+ fi ¡ q0j
2
Where q0j is anticipated to follow the same reaction:
q0j =
A+ f 0j ¡ q0i
2
Solving this second system, and taking into account that in equilibrium
conjectures have to be correct, one …nds:
q0i =
A+ 2f 0i ¡ f 0j
3
Finally, reaction functions become:
qi =
A+ 2
3
fi +
1
3
f 0i ¡ f 0j
3
Then, the problem of deciding the positions in the forward market is:
max
fi
pqi
4
s.t qi =
A+ 2
3
fi +
1
3
f 0i ¡ f 0j
3
qj =
A+ 2
3
fj +
1
3
f 0j ¡ f 0i
3
p = A¡ q1 ¡ q2
The solution of this problem gives fi =
fj¡f 0j
2
. In equilibrium fj = f 0j,
leading to the Cournot solution with f1 = f2 = 0. Hence observability is a
necessary condition to obtain the pro-competitive e¤ect in the presence of
futures markets.
3 The role of observability
In this section we study the role of observability in more detail. According
to H&K, the pro-competitive e¤ect in A&V takes place only if positions in
the futures market are observed. If they are not, the equilibrium reverts to
Cournot. However, their result is based on two implicit assumptions. The
…rst one is a result of a strong version of the no-arbitrage condition: the
price in the futures market must be the same as in the spot market in every
contingency. This means that the two prices have to coincide, not only along
the equilibrium path, but in deviations from the equilibrium as well. The
second assumption is that …rms cannot observe prices in the futures market.
They realize deviations only when they produce and sell in the spot market.
Let us discuss these assumptions in more detail.
(i) The strong no-arbitrage condition. It is most natural to require that,
in equilibrium, futures and spot prices be the same. If not, some agent can
pro…t by buying in one marker and selling in the other. Once these arbitrage
opportunities are exhausted, prices are identical. Take, then, an equilibrium
situation in which the no-arbitrage condition is satis…ed, and think of the
consequences of a …rm deviating by selling a larger quantity in the futures
market. This implies an increase in the total quantity sold in the markets,
and a lower price in the spot market. Should this imply also a lower (and
identical) price in the futures market? If agents have perfect information
of what is going on in the futures market, this seems the only reasonable
consequence. On the other hand, if agents in the futures market do not have
this perfect information, they may not recognize deviations (or, at least, the
exact size of them), and the price in the futures market may not re‡ect the
price that will prevail in the spot market, where Cournot competition in the
residual demand (after discounting futures sales) reveals the spot price. The
existence of an agent that can foresee this di¤erence in prices may not be
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the only natural assumption. Only if the deviation is anticipated the change
on price will re‡ect the new quantity. However, there are two reasons why
this may not be the case. First, once a strategy pro…le is considered as
an equilibrium candidate, there may be more than one possible deviation
to anticipate. How do agents know which one is actually taking place to
adjust the price? Second, the pro…tability of a deviation may depend on the
reaction of other agents, and, then, on the price induced by the deviation.
These considerations call for a very detailed model on how to link deviations
with prices.
(ii) Observability of prices in the futures market. In the case agents have
perfect information about quantities sold in the futures market it is hard
to justify that some …rm may not know about this. After all, by selling a
small quantity in the futures market, any …rm may enter the market and
know the price, and a fortiori, the quantities sold. In the presence of perfect
competition on the demand side of the futures market, only when agents in
this market are not fully aware of the quantities sold (out of the equilibrium
path), then one can also assume similar things for …rms. Again this calls for
a very precise modeling of how agents and …rms gather information.
From the discussion above, at least three possibilities arise:
(1) Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and
…rms observe quantities (or prices) in the futures market.
(2) Future and spot market prices coincide in every contingency, and
…rms cannot observe prices or quantities in the futures market, and
(3) Future and spot market prices coincide along the equilibrium path and
…rms observe prices, but not quantities in the futures market.
Next we present explicit game forms representing all of the three cases (1,
2 and subcases of 3). The …rst case corresponds to the equilibrium outcome
in A&V, case 2 corresponds to the model in H&K with no observability that
leads to the Cournot outcome. Case 3 deals with a weaker version of the no-
arbitrage condition and opens new possibilities, depending of how deviations
from the equilibrium are observed and a¤ect the price in the futures market.
The di¤erences in the game form highlights the merits of each of the cases. In
particular, cases 1 and 2 do not explicitly model de demand side of the futures
market, while cases in 3 do model this side of the market. Furthermore, in
case 3, the arbitrage condition is a consequence of the equilibrium itself, not
an assumption, like in cases 1 and 2. Finally, it should be mentioned that
case 3 has as a particular case the situation in which …rms observe futures
prices that are not informative. This is equivalent to the case in which …rms
do not observe futures prices at all. We’ll look for sequential equilibria (SE)
in pure strategies.
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3.1 Case 1. The game form of the model in A&V
We present this game form corresponding to the model in A&V for the shake
of completeness. Recall that the strong version of no-arbitrage must be
satis…ed, and that (f1; f2) are observed. The game is depicted in …gure 1.
Insert …gure 1 here
The subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of this game is easily calculated
backwards as shown in section 2. Since it is unique, its also a sequential
equilibrium (SE).
3.2 Case 2. The result of H&K
Again, the strong version of the no-arbitrage condition is assumed. Quantity
fi is not observed by …rm j 6= i and there is no other information to be
known form the futures market (in particular the futures market price pf ).
The game tree is depicted in …gure 2.
Insert …gure 2 here
Next we show that this is, in fact, the same case, with the same solu-
tion, as the model in H&K presented in section 2. This is done in the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the game in …gure 2, with payo¤s as described be-
fore. Then, the only SE is the following: …rm i chooses fi = 0; and si = A¡fi3 ,
and …rm i believes with probability one that it is in node after fj = 0.
Proof. First show that the strategy is indeed a SE. In the equilibrium …rms
are playing the Cournot outcome, with pro…ts given by ¦i = A
2
9
: Standard
Cournot analysis show that there is no pro…table deviation from si. To
check that there is no pro…table deviation from fi = 0 consider f 0i > 0, while
fj = 0. After this deviation si changes to s0i =
A¡f 0i
3
, p to p0 = A¡2f
0
i
3
, and ¦i
to ¦0i =
A¡2f 0i
3
³
A¡2f 0i
3
+ f 0i
´
=
A2¡(2f 0i)
2
9
< A
2
9
. To …nish this part of the proof
notice that beliefs are consistent.
To show that the SE is unique consider any other strategy (f1; f2) in
which one …rm, say i, chooses fi > 0. Again, Cournot analysis in the second
stage indicates that, in equilibrium, s1 = s2 = A¡f1¡f23 : Suppose now that,
instead of fi, …rm i plays f 0i . After positions (f
0
i ; fj), the other variables
take values s0i =
A¡f 0i¡fj
3
, p = A ¡ s0i ¡ sj ¡ f 0i ¡ fj = A¡2f
0
i+fi¡fj
3
, and
7
¦0i =
A¡2f 0i+fi¡fj
3
A+2f 0i¡fj
3
. In the last expression observe that, for every
initial fi pro…ts achieve a unique maximum at f 0i =
fi
4
. This means that the
only case when there is no pro…table deviation is fi = 0.
3.3 Case 3.1: Weak version of no-arbitrage, f1+ f2 ob-
served by arbitrators.
In the previous cases prices in the futures market were automatically set
equal to spot market prices. To introduce prices in the futures market as
an independent variable, we add new players that select these prices. The
new game is as follows. In a …rst stage …rms simultaneously decide positions
in the futures market (f1 and f2). In the second stage, and after observing
these actions, n arbitrators o¤er simultaneously a price at which to buy
these quantities. Finally, in the third stage, after observing prices in the
futures market, …rms sell in the spot market. The payo¤s for the …rms are
calculated as usual. If arbitrator j o¤ers the highest price (say pj) she buys
all future quantities and makes pro…ts given by ¦j = (pj ¡ ps) (f1 + f2),
where ps is the price in the spot market. If the highest price p is o¤ered by
m arbitrators, each buys 1
m
of the futures quantities and has pro…ts given
by ¦j = (p¡ ps) f1+f2m . The game is depicted in …gure 3. For simplicity,
only 2 arbitrators are shown. Nodes a1; a2; a3 and a4 belong to di¤erent
information sets of arbitrator 1. Similarly nodes
©
bk
ª
k
(alt.
©
ck
ª
k
,
©
dk
ª
k
)
belong to di¤erent information sets of arbitrator 2 (alt. …rm 1, …rm 2).
Insert …gure 3 here
Proposition 2 Consider the game in …gure 3 with payo¤s as described above.
Then, in all sequential equilibria …rms sell f1 = f2 = A5 in their …rst move,
arbitrators set prices p1 = ::: = pn =
A¡f1¡f2
3
, and …nally, …rms sell s1 =
s2 = max fp1; :::; png in the spot market.
Proof. In the third stage …rms are playing the Cournot outcome, s1 =
s2 = pj =
A¡f1¡f2
3
, and therefore, will not deviate from it. This implies
pj = ps =
A¡f1¡f2
3
, and no pro…table deviations by arbitrators. In the …rst
stage, …rms must solve (1), as in case 1, to …nd their best reply at this stage.
The solution gives f1 = f2 = A5 . To see that the equilibrium is unique notice
that, in the third stage …rms are playing the unique equilibrium strategy, that
arbitrators will deviate from strategies that do not imply p1 = p2 = A¡f1¡f23 ,
and that the solution to …rms’ maximization problem in the …rst stage is
unique.
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3.4 Case 3.2: Weak version of the no-arbitrage condi-
tion, f1 + f2 not observed by arbitrators.
As long as prices in the futures market anticipate the price in the spot mar-
ket, it is not sensible to assume that …rms cannot deduce total quantities.
Therefore, in order to have non informed …rms, it must be the case that
arbitrators are themselves not well informed. There may be many ways to
model this situation. We start by choosing a simple and radical one. Namely,
that buyers in the futures market do not know total positions in this mar-
ket. I.e., we have a game as before, except that arbitrators cannot condition
their actions (p1; :::; pn) on quantities (f1; f2). Later, we relax this extreme
assumption. The game form is the same as in …gure 3, except that now nodes©
ak
ª
k
(
©
bk
ª
k
) belong to the same information set of arbitrator 1 (2). Finally,
fc1; c2g 2 u1, fc3; c4g 2 v1, fd1; d3g 2 u2 and fd2; d4g 2 v2, where ui and vi
are di¤erent information sets of …rm i.
An interesting feature of this game is that the demand in the futures
market does not react to deviations made by the …rms. This opens the
possibility for di¤erent prices in the two markets as a result of deviations.
The lack of information in the model does not allow arbitrage between them.
However, in equilibrium, both prices have to coincide since the equilibrium
must be anticipated by all players in the game.
Proposition 3 Consider the game de…ned before; then, in all sequential
equilibria, …rms choose f1 and f2 such that f1 ¸ A; f2 ¸ A, and s1 = s2 = 0.
Proof. In any equilibrium it must be that ps = pj = p for any arbitrator
j and that s1 = s2 = ps (because of Cournot behavior in the spot market).
Now see that any equilibrium requires ps = 0. Suppose, to the contrary,
that ps = A ¡ s1 ¡ s2 ¡ f1 ¡ f2 > 0. In this situation, if …rm i increases
its future positions by ¢fi its pro…ts increase by ¢fi £ p. If fj < A; but
still f1 + f2 ¸ A and, hence, p = 0, …rm i can deviate to f 0i = 0. This
deviation does not change the futures price (p = 0), as is not observed by
arbitrators. Now …rm i can sell si =
A¡fj
2
with the consequence of ps =
A¡fj
2
,
and pro…ts ¦i =
³
A¡fj
2
´2
> 0. Hence, the equilibrium requires f1 ¸ A;
f2 ¸ A, ps = pj = si = 0. It is straightforward to check that this is indeed
an equilibrium as pro…ts are zero regardless of unilateral deviations.
If read literally, this case makes little sense, but we can provide a more
reasonable interpretation. Consider again the strategy consisting of not sell-
ing in the futures market and selling the Cournot quantity in the spot market.
Even if there are many agents in the futures market, some of them should
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detect the deviation consisting of a …rm selling a positive amount in this
market. Knowing this, they have to anticipate a lower price in the spot mar-
ket and, consequently, negotiate a lower price in the futures market as well.
However, according to the structure of the game, the agents in the futures
market cannot make this observation (they just set a price and receive pay-
o¤s at the end of the game.) There are at least two possible justi…cations.
If there are many arbitrators, the deviating …rm may sell only a little to
each of them, who observes then a small quantity and anticipates a small
change in the price. If this amount is small enough, the analysis may ignore
it. Alternatively, the action of selling fi = 0 may be interpreted as an ideal
description of a reality that is closer to fi = ", where " is arbitrarily small.
In this case, the deviation consisting of selling small quantities to di¤erent
arbitrators may not be observed. Next we see that, in fact, this is a particular
case of a more general one.
3.5 A general case: f1 + f2 observed imperfectly by
arbitrators.
Cases 3.1 and 3.2 represent two extremes of reactions in the futures market
towards changes in the quantities. In case 3.1, arbitrators observed pre-
cisely these quantities, whereas in case 3.2 they observed nothing. Next we
model an intermediate situation of partial observability. Arbitrators can only
observe whether total quantities in the futures market belong to a certain
information set.
In the …rst stage …rms choose simultaneously quantities f1 and f2 within
the interval
£
0; B
2
¤
, where B
2
> A. Setting an upper bound to the quantities
…rms may sell only prevents us from considering subgames in which futures
positions are in…nite. Consider the set of partitions on the interval [0;B]
in which sets are either intervals of length at least a pre-…xed ± > 0 or real
numbers. Denote this set of partitions by U. Given F = f1+f2, in the second
stage arbitrator j’s information partition is a set Uj ½ U. I.e., arbitrators
observe F or, at least, are able to determine that F is in a certain interval.
All arbitrators have the same information partition on futures quantities; i.e.,
for all j, Uj = U . Arbitrators choose prices contingent on information sets.
In the third stage …rms observe prices set by arbitrators and decide s1 and
s2.
The game form is the same as in …gure 3 except that now any nodes belong
to the same information set of a given player according to the stated condition
(recall that a …rm always knows its own past actions). Case 3.1 is the limit of
this general case when arbitrators’ information partition gets …ner, and case
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3.2 corresponds to the situation in which arbitrators’ information partition
have only one information set containing all nodes such that f1+ f2 2 [0; B].
Proposition 4 Consider the game described before. Then, the only prices
sustained by a SE in pure strategies are p = 0 and A
6
· p · A
5
.
Proof. Propositions 2 and 3 already show that p = 0 and p = A
5
can be
sustained by a SE; only notice that arbitrators’ information sets are in U:
The rest of the proof is dedicated to show that the only other prices that can
be sustained in equilibrium are A
6
· p < A
5
. Recall that to sustain a price
p > 0 by a SE, the required total quantity must be q = A ¡ p, and also
that the spot quantities must satisfy s1 = s2 = p. Total futures positions
compatible with these conditions require f1+ f2 = F = q¡ s1 ¡ s2 = A¡ 3p
or p = A¡F
3
. To sustain p take f1 > 0 and f2 > 0 such that F = f1 + f2 =
A¡ 3p. In a SE arbitrators must assign probability 1 to the total quantity
F , and o¤er prices pj = p: If …rms choose f1 and f2; …rm one’s pro…ts are
¦1 = p (f1 + s1) =
A¡f1¡f2
3
A+2f1¡f2
3
: To consider possible deviations from the
proposed scenario we need to distinguish several cases. Given the structure
of information sets, it is straightforward to see that there are only three
possibilities for F :
(i) F 2 u for some interval u 2 U . (F cannot be known with certainty.)
(ii) F 2 I , where I is an interval such that for all u 2 I; u 2 U . (F and
a neighborhood around it can be known with certainty.)
(iii) F 2 U and is the frontier of an interval u 2 U such that F =2 u. (F can
be known with certainty, but is in the frontier of an interval of uncertainty.)
(i) Consider …rm one’s deviation to (f 01; s
0
1) with f
0
1 + f2 belonging to the
same information set as F , and with s01 =
A¡f 01¡f2¡s2
2
. Because arbitrators do
not observe the deviation, futures price does not change: i.e., for all j 2 N ,
pj =
A¡f1¡f2
3
. Because the price in the futures market does not change, …rm 2
does not change its spot quantity, s2 = A¡f1¡f23 , and then s
0
1 =
2A¡3f 01¡2f2+f1
6
.
The spot price, however, changes to p0 = A¡f 01¡f2¡s01¡s2 = 2A¡3f
0
1¡2f2+f1
6
=
s01. Then …rm one’s pro…ts are given by ¦
0
1 =
A¡f1¡f2
3
f 01 +
³
2A¡3f 01¡2f2+f1
6
´2
.
The di¤erence in pro…ts is ¦01 ¡¦1 = 14 (f 01 ¡ f1)2. This di¤erence is positive
for any f 01 6= f1; which means that no equilibrium may exist in this case.
(ii) A deviation to f 01 within a neighborhood of f1 gives pro…ts ¦
0
1 =
A¡f 01¡f2
3
A+2f 01¡f2
3
: The di¤erence in pro…ts is now given by the expression
¦01 ¡ ¦1 = 19 (f 01 ¡ f1) (A¡ 2f 01 ¡ 2f1 ¡ f2). If A ¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 > 0, take f 01 =
f1 + ", with " > 0 small enough, to get ¦01 ¡ ¦1 > 0. If A ¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 < 0,
take f 01 = f1 ¡ ".
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(iii) There are four relevant cases. (iii.a) A¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 < 0 and f1 + f2 is
located at the left end of an interval of uncertainty (open to the left), (iii.b)
A ¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 > 0 and f1 + f2 is located at the right end of an interval of
uncertainty (open to the right), (iii.c) A¡ 4f1¡ f2 > 0 and f1+ f2 is located
at the left end of an interval of uncertainty, (iii.d) A ¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 < 0 and
f1 + f2 is located at the right end of an interval of uncertainty. The cases
when A ¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 = 0 and A¡ 4f2 ¡ f1 = 0 are solved like in proposition
2 and give p = A
5
in equilibrium. In the …rst two cases, the deviation is
perfectly observed, in case (iii.a) repeat case (ii) with f 01 = f1 + ", and in
(iii.b) repeat (ii) with f 01 = f1 ¡ " to conclude that there are no equilibria.
For the other two cases, notice that if futures positions are not perfectly
observed after the deviation, arbitrators will o¤er a price p0, their contingent
price for the information set induced by …rm 1. The new pro…ts for …rm 1 are
given by ¦0 = p0f 01+
³
A¡f 01¡f2¡p0
2
´2
. In case (iii.c) p0 < A¡f1¡f2
3
and the max-
imum for this expression restricted to f 01 ¸ f1 corresponds to f 01 = f1: This
implies that if …rm 1 deviates from f1 to induce p0, it better do it with a very
small deviation. I.e., f 01 = f1+" for a small " > 0. The gain in pro…ts are (ex-
cept for terms in ") ¦0 ¡¦ = 1
36
(5A¡ 17f1 ¡ 5f2 ¡ 3p0) (A¡ f1 ¡ f2 ¡ 3p0).
The expression in the second parenthesis is positive. The expression in
the …rst parenthesis attains its in…mum with respect to p0, and restricted
to p0 < A¡f1¡f2
3
at p0 = A¡f1¡f2
3
: This in…mum is 4 (A¡ 3f1 ¡ f2) > 0 if
A¡ 4f1 ¡ f2 > 0, as required in this case. In case (iii.d) p0 > A¡f1¡f23 , and
the maximum of ¦0 also corresponds to f 01 = f1; which implies that …rm
one’s deviation should be f 01 = f1 ¡ ": The expression for ¦0 ¡¦ is the same
as in (iii.c). The second parenthesis is negative, and the …rst parenthesis
is always non negative if A ¡ 3f1 ¡ f2 ¸ 0: By symmetry, to get that no
pro…table deviations exist for the other …rm we have that A¡ 4f2 ¡ f1 ¸ 0
and A¡ 3f2 ¡ f1 ¸ 0. I.e., there are equilibria as long as 2A¡ 5f1 ¡ 5f2 ¸ 0
and 2A¡ 4f1 ¡ 4f2 ¸ 0, which implies 45A · f1 + f2 · A and A6 · p · A5 :
4 Discussion
According to H&K …rms perform better in a situation in which futures mar-
kets are opaque (they get the Cournot pro…ts) rather than transparent (where
they get the more competitive A&V outcome). This means that, given the
choice, they prefer opaque markets. However, if both markets are present,
the …rms face a prisoners’ dilemma, as they have an incentive to use the
transparent market to try to get a higher market share. Our model, how-
ever, indicates that, if the demand side of the futures market is sensitive
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enough in the sense of setting prices that re‡ect actual quantities, observ-
ability of futures quantities by …rms does not make a di¤erence as in any
case the outcome is that in A&V. Therefore, …rms will be indi¤erent if given
the choice. On the other hand if prices in the futures market do not react
with enough sensibility to a change of quantities, the result may change to
more competitive outcome. In this case they prefer the transparent market
and face no prisoners’ dilemma.
The liberalization of the power market in England and Wales provides
a case of an oligopolistic industry with two futures markets, Contracts for
Di¤erences (CfD) and Electricity Forward Agreements (EFA), the CfD being
much more opaque. According to estimates in Power UK (1998), around 1998
the coverture of the CdF’s was near 90% of the market, while the EFA’s
accounted for less than 30%. This contradicts H&K’s model, but not ours
if prices are informative. Of course, our model does not explain that …rms
prefer the opaque market, but is compatible with other forces that may induce
…rms to do so. For example, …rms may show a collusive behavior that may be
better implemented in real life in the more opaque market. This possibility
has been mentioned in OXERA (1994) and is explored in the context of a
repeated situation of the model by A&V in Ferreira (2000).
5 Conclusion
Allaz and Vila (1993) show that if a futures market is added to the spot
market in an oligopolistic industry, …rms show a more competitive behavior.
Hughs and Kao (1997) argue that …rms must have perfect information about
futures quantities for this result to hold. Furthermore, according to them,
without this information …rms behave like in Cournot. We claimed that,
while it is true that perfect information leads to the result in A&V, the lack
of information may not lead to Cournot. In fact, our model shows that the
result may be even more competitive if agents in the futures markets are not
well informed about quantities o¤ered by …rms. If the demand side in the
futures market are informed, the fact that …rms are not informed is irrelevant.
This later case provides a theoretical model for the observed behavior in the
futures markets of the UK power industry, which contradicts H&K’s results.
Our model suggests that a closer look at the structure of the markets
may provide di¤erent results that those obtained in a reduced form (in our
work, case 3 versus 2). There is a large literature on Market Microstructure
Theory (see O’Hara, 1995, and references within), but we are not aware of a
work in which intermediaries have and information structure comparable to
the one we developed here.
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